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pAbstract
While there is a fairly broad consensus regarding the potential adverse effects of
generous unemployment benefit insurance on steady-state employment, the
short-term effects of benefit reforms are not well-established. This paper contributes
to fill this gap by estimating impulse responses to benefit reform “shocks” identified
for a panel of OECD countries. Findings indicate that although it takes time for
unemployment benefit reforms to pay off, such reforms do not appear to entail any
negative short-run effects. There is however some suggestive evidence that reducing
unemployment benefits could have negative short-run effects in “bad times”.
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response function1. Introduction
While the theoretical case for public unemployment insurance is compelling (Blanchard
and Tirole 2008), the potential adverse effects of high benefit replacement rates on
steady-state employment have also long been identified in mainstream labor market
theories (e.g. Layard et al. 1991; Pissarides 2000). With some qualifications1, the theoretical
prediction that – all else equal – high benefits should lower the equilibrium employment
level is supported by a wide body of empirical literature, be it macroeconometric work
based on cross-country time-series panel data (e.g. Bassanini and Duval 2009; Nickell
et al. 2005) or country-specific microeconometric analysis based on difference-in-
differences approaches (Card 1990; Card and Krueger 1994).
However, the typical theoretical analysis provides some insights into the long-term
impact of a change in policy settings from a static comparative perspective. Much less
explored has been the dynamics of the economy towards its new (post-benefit reform)
steady state, leaving largely unanswered the question of whether unemployment benefit
(and other labor market) reforms take time to pay-off or might even imply trading
long-term gains for short-term pain. Yet in the presence of Keynesian features in the
economy, benefit cuts could lower aggregate demand temporarily weaken output and
employment, thereby delaying the gains from reform. This could happen for instance if
the unemployed have an above-average marginal propensity to consume (possibly2012 Bouis et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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to the associated reduction in aggregate demand (possibly because monetary policy
faces a binding zero-bound constraint, see e.g. Eggertsson 2010). Beyond its theoretical
relevance, the short-term impact of benefit reform also bears major implications for the
political feasibility of labor market reforms, as possible transitional losses have often
been put forward as an obstacle to their implementation in the policy debate, over and
above the usual political economy factors.
Some emerging literature has used small and large-scale dynamic general equilibrium
models to explore the dynamic effects of labor market reforms (e.g. Cacciatore et al.
2012; Everaert and Schule 2008; Gomes et al. 2011). One consensual finding is that
labor market reforms appear to pay off only gradually, consistent with the presence of
frictions in labor markets. While a negative short-term impact is a theoretical possibility –
at least under certain conditions, such as if the country considered is a small member of a
monetary union – in all such models, whether it materializes in practical simulations
depends on the specific design features of the models and their key calibrated parameter
values, as well as on how labor markets are represented.
By contrast, to our knowledge no empirical evidence exists concerning the short-term
employment effect of unemployment benefit or other labor market reforms. By design,
microeconometric analysis – which is otherwise the most robust approach to identify the
impact of benefit level or duration cuts on job search and the length of unemployment
spells – is poorly suited to assess the economy-wide, general equilibrium effects of reform.
Cross-country time-series analysis would therefore seem the most natural choice in this
particular case. However, existing studies have relied either on static panel data estimates
of a reduced-form unemployment equation, or on dynamic panel specifications in which
the short-term dynamics of unemployment is very basic and by construction similar for
all types of reforms.
This paper contributes to fill this gap by adopting a different macro panel data
approach. Specifically, benefit reform “shocks” are identified for a panel of OECD
countries spanning three decades, and turned into reform variables following the
methodology outlined by Romer and Romer (2010) to estimate fiscal multipliers at
various horizons based on measures of fiscal shocks. The dynamic impact of reforms
on employment is then estimated following the simple approach proposed by Jorda
(2005), which allows some direct estimation of impulse response functions (IRFs). IRFs
are estimated for up to five years after the reform. The main findings are three-fold.
First, it takes time for unemployment benefit reform to pay off, with its impact continuing
to be felt into the fifth year after the reform. Second, although reforms materialize only
gradually, they do not appear to entail any negative short-run effects. Third, we find
however some tentative evidence that reducing the generosity of unemployment
income support could have negative short-run effects in “bad times”, i.e. when output
and employment are particularly depressed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the approach
taken to identify unemployment benefit reform “shocks” and details the econometric
approach used to identify their dynamic effects. Section 3 provides the results from
the empirical analysis, and Section 4 checks for the sensitivity of the results to the
use of alternative reform identification criteria and econometric specifications. Section
5 concludes.
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2.1. Identification of reform shocks
The identification of reform shocks relies on the OECD’s summary indicator of (average
gross) unemployment benefit replacement rates over the first year of the unemployment
spell. This indicator is available from the OECD’s Benefits and Wages database for 21
OECD countries over the period 1961–2007. It is derived from benefit model simulations
and is computed as an average across two earnings levels (100% and 66% of average wage
levels) and three family situations (single, married with dependent spouse and without
children, married with dependent spouse and two children).
A decline in this indicator is assumed to signal a “reform”, which depending on the
magnitude of the change can be fairly negligible or instead sizeable. In order to identify
the effects of reform on aggregate unemployment, we focus on major reforms and
identify reform shocks as follows. The standard deviation of the annual change in the
benefit replacement rate indicator is calculated over all available observations. A major
reform is then assumed to have been undertaken when the change in the policy indicator
in a given year exceeds (minus) 2 standard deviations2. Because the criterion set to
identify reform shocks is ultimately arbitrary, we perform sensitivity analysis to assess the
robustness of the results to alternative thresholds (1.5 and 2.5 standard deviations). Table 1
presents for each sample country the reform shocks identified using this methodology, as
well as basic summary statistics regarding the reform shocks. Over the sample, benefit
reforms appear to have been carried out mainly in English-speaking countries (Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States) as well as in
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden).
2.2. Econometric approach
Based on the identification of reform shocks, a reform variable is constructed following
the methodology outlined by Romer and Romer (2010) to estimate fiscal multipliers at
various horizons based on measures of fiscal shocks. The following “reform variable” is
constructed by country and year: i) when a reform shock has been identified for a
particular country and year, the reform variable takes the value of the change in the
associated policy indicator; ii) if no reform shock has been identified, the reform
variable takes a zero value. Allowing the reform variable to take the value of the change in
the underlying policy indicator results in a continuous variable that allows quantifying theTable 1 The reform shocks: summary statistics and country details
Panel A – Summary Statistics
Reform area Number of
reform shocks
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Decline in initial unemployment
benefit replacement rate, 1st year (%)
16 8.55 2.93 5.50 14.75
Panel B – Countries and years of reform
Austria 1983, 1993 Slovak Republic 2005
Canada 1997, 2005 Spain 1985, 1993
Denmark 1995 Sweden 1999
Greece 1993 United Kingdom 1983, 1999
Ireland 1985, 1989, 1995 United States 1987
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variable instead3. Relying on the constructed benefit reform variable, impulse responses
to the reforms are then estimated for the aggregate employment rate. The employment
rate is preferred over the unemployment rate in order to account for any offsetting
unemployment and labor force participation effects – for instance, any reform-driven
decline in unemployment could in principle be concomitant with a decline in labor force
participation, resulting in a smaller gain or even a decline in the overall employment rate.
The estimation of IRFs is then based on the simple approach proposed by Jorda
(2005). Concretely, the following cross country time-series equation is estimated for
each of the five years (k = 1. . .5) after the occurrence of the reform shock,
Ei;tþk  Ei;t ¼ αk þ
Xj¼5
j¼0
βk;jΔEi;tj þ θkreformi;t þ
Xj¼5
j¼0
λh;k;jcrisish;k;tj þ γ i;k þ γt;k þ εi;t;k ;
ð1Þ
where Ei,t is the employment rate in country i at time t, reform is the benefit reform
variable (which, as explained above, is equal to the variation of the underlying policy
indicator in case a reform has been identified and zero otherwise), crisish is a set of four
dummies taking value one if the country experienced respectively a bank crisis, a
currency crisis, a debt crisis, or a recession, and γik and γtk are respectively country and
time fixed effects. Five lags of the crisis dummies are introduced. The financial crisis
dummies are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008). The recession dummy is equal to
one in years when real GDP growth is negative and zero otherwise.
The introduction of a dummy variable coding for recessions is justified by the finding
that economic crises are major facilitators of the reform process (see e.g. Duval 2008).
Because economic crises are also likely to affect the dependent variable while being
correlated with the probability to observe a reform shock, not controlling for them in
the regression would introduce an omitted variable bias. Reverse causality should not
be an issue in this set-up provided reforms were not introduced in response to a future
expected change in the (un)employment rate. Even if the latter condition were not met,
the political economy literature suggests certain reforms would typically be undertaken
in response to a future crisis, i.e. to a decline – rather than an increase – in employment.
Therefore any associated bias in the estimated coefficients θk in Equation 1 would be in
the direction of finding adverse short-term employment effects of reform. Yet, despite
such (highly) hypothetical bias, the estimates presented in Section 3 below show in fact a
beneficial short-term employment impact of reform.
The estimated coefficients θk give the response at horizon k, and together they yield
the impulse response function. While the presence of a lagged dependent variable and
country fixed effects may in principle bias the estimation of the βs in short samples
(Nickell 1981), the length of the time dimension mitigates any such concerns since the
finite sample bias is of the order of 1/T, where T is the length of the time dimension
(Greene 2000). Another potential issue is that estimates of coefficients θk ultimately
rely on a limited number of reform shock episodes (see Table 1). However, to the extent
that these are random, the estimator is consistent and – given our reasonable sample
size T = 400 to 500 – should deliver an estimate close to the “true parameter value”.
Furthermore, as discussed below, we check for the robustness of coefficient estimates
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the number of shocks considered in the estimation. Our results are robust to this test.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Parameter estimates of the
autoregressive βs, the fixed effects γ or the crisis dummies are of no particular interest
for the analysis4.
The employment impact of benefit reform could potentially be weaker in depressed
labor markets. Raising incentives for the unemployed to intensify job search and accept
existing offers might be effective at increasing outflows from unemployment when the
labor market is tight, but could become less effective when labor demand is particularly
weak – which may happen if the monetary authority cannot respond to maintain full
employment, as may be the case for a member country of a large monetary union or in
a depressed economic situation where the zero-bound constraint on monetary policy
becomes binding. In order to explore this possibility, the econometric analysis also
assesses whether the impact of benefit reforms varies depending on the cyclical pos-
ition of the economy. In practice, an indicator of the cyclical conditions is interacted
with the reform shock variable as follows:
Ei;tþk  Ei;t ¼ αk þ
Xj¼5
j¼0




λh;k;jcrisish;k;tj þ γ ik þ γtk þ εitk :
ð2Þ
where cycleit is the cyclical position of the economy considered just prior to the intro-
duction of the reform and is measured by the OECD’s estimate of the unemployment
gap. Because the latter is ultimately an unobserved variable subject to some degree of
uncertainty, we regard this part of the analysis as more suggestive than fully conclusive.
3. Estimation results
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. The employment rate impact of a reduction
in the initial unemployment benefit replacement rate appears to materialize only grad-
ually. The estimated effect becomes statistically significant only in the third year, and is still
increasing into the fifth year. For example, a reduction in the initial unemployment
benefit replacement rate of around 8 percentage points (corresponding to the median
reform in the estimation sample) would translate into a 0.5 percentage point increase
in the employment rate after three years and into an almost 1 percentage pointTable 2 Baseline estimation results
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement rate 0.027 0.047 0.069** 0.095** 0.123**
(0.017) (0.035) (0.033) (0.043) (0.046)
No. observations 503 474 446 418 390
R2 0.453 0.455 0.435 0.427 0.427
No. of countries 29 28 28 28 28
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ** represents statistical significance at the 5% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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steady-state impact estimated in Bassanini and Duval (2006), suggesting that it may take
as much as five years on average for the full gains from benefit reform to materialize.
The generosity of unemployment insurance depends on both replacement rates and
the duration of benefits. We hence extend the previous analysis by controlling the
regression for the impact of reforms reducing the duration of unemployment benefits
(Table 3). Following the approach in Nickell et al. (2005) and Bassanini and Duval
(2009), the underlying benefit duration variable is computed indirectly as the ratio of
(OECD measures of ) average replacement rates over a five-year unemployment spell to
first-year replacement rates5. Bearing in mind that only six reform shocks are identified over
the sample, results are qualitatively consistent with those reported above but the impact of
benefit duration reforms seems to take more time to materialize, up to five years.
The empirical analysis suggests that the short-term impact of unemployment benefit
reforms varies depending on the business cycle position (Table 4, Panel A). Evaluating
the size of these interactions requires calculating marginal effects of reforms for differ-
ent levels of economic activity (and their corresponding standard errors). Table 4, Panel
B reports synthetic results on the employment impact of the unemployment benefit
reform calculated at the minimum, median and maximum values of the unemployment
gap. While the baseline analysis suggests that on average positive effects of this reform
materialise quite rapidly, interacting the reform shock variable with the unemployment
gap suggests that short-term gains are stronger during “good” times, and weaker – and
in some cases even negative – during “bad” times. This finding is consistent with some
micro-econometric evidence (Bover et al. 2002; Schmieder et al. 2012) which points to
smaller disincentive effects from unemployment benefits – and therefore to smaller
potential job search intensity and employment gains from benefit reform – in weak
economic conditions. Taken at face value, the estimates imply that a median reductionFigure 1 Change in aggregate employment following a reduction in the initial unemployment
benefit replacement rate. Note: ** represents statistical significance at the 5% level. The simulation is
based on the median-sized reform observed in the estimation sample.
Table 3 The impact of benefit duration reforms
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
0.028 0.047 0.068** 0.096** 0.125**
(0.017) (0.035) (0.032) (0.044) (0.047)
Decline of UB duration 2 standard
deviation threshold
1.598 0.991 −4.876 2.630 12.186*
(1.329) (3.426) (3.532) (5.493) (6.525)
No. observations 503 474 446 418 390
R2 0.454 0.456 0.436 0.427 0.428
No. of countries 29 28 28 28 28
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES







Decline of UB duration 2 standard
deviation threshold
6 −0,2 0.09 −0,13 −0.36
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 4 The influence of economic conditions
Panel A – Estimation results
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement rate 0.025 0.047 0.075** 0.125** 0.165***
(0.016) (0.032) (0.030) (0.051) (0.052)
Unemployment Gap −0.194*** −0.666*** −1.221*** −1.711*** −2.000***
(0.061) (0.120) (0.179) (0.261) (0.329)
(Decline of initial UB replacement rate) ×
(Unemployment Gap)
0.002 0.011 0.029** 0.049*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019)
No. observations 492 463 435 407 379
R2 0.482 0.523 0.553 0.590 0.613
No. of countries 29 28 28 28 28
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B – Synthetic results of the employment impact of the UB reform at the minimum, median and
maximum values of the unemployment gap (in percentage points)
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Minimum 0.102 −0.201 −0.918 −1.559* −1.876**
(0.237) (0.479) (0.557) (0.778) (0.873)
Median 0.184 0.327 0.490** 0.819** 1.097***
(0.117) (0.228) (0.215) (0.364) (0.372)
Maximum 0.226 0.607 1.235*** 2.073*** 2.661***
(0.198) (0.435) (0.445) (0.687) (0.699)
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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point employment gain after three years when the unemployment gap is at its median
value of close to zero, but the same reform would not have any statistically significant effect
for lower values of the initial unemployment gap and even bring significant employment
losses in very depressed labor markets (Figure 2)6.
4. Sensitivity analysis
In order to assess the sensitivity of the baseline results, we perform the three following
robustness checks:
 The use of alternative thresholds beyond which the change in a benefit replacement
rate indicator is identified as a reform shock. In the baseline approach, a reform
shock is identified when the benefit replacement rate indicator varies by more than
two standard deviations of the annual variation calculated over all available
observations. Here we test for the robustness of the baseline results when reducing
or increasing the occurrence of reform shocks, i.e. by raising the stringency
criterion used to identify them to 2.5 standard deviations or reducing it to 1.5
standard deviations. This comes across as considering “smaller” and “larger”
reforms than in the baseline, respectively.
 The introduction of “reverse” reforms, measured as large changes in the benefit
replacement rate indicator in the opposite direction, as additional control variables7.
The results from the baseline approach are based on regressions that ignore “reverse”
reforms, which can be defined as a large increase in the benefit replacement rate.
Insofar as large increases in benefit replacement rates reduce employment rates,
omitting them from the regressions may lead to an overestimation of the positive
effects of reforms. Instead of disentangling the effects of positive and negative reform
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Figure 2 Change in aggregate employment following a reduction in the initial unemployment
benefit replacement rate: the influence of economic conditions. Note: The lower line corresponds to
the impact of the reform during “bad” times, while the upper line represents the impact during “good”
times, corresponding to the minimum and maximum levels of the unemployment gap, respectively, as
observed across the sample (i.e. across all countries and time). The central broken line represents the impact of
the reform when the unemployment gap equals its median value. The pre-reform unemployment gap is
calculated as the difference between the structural unemployment rate (i.e. the NAIRU, or non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment – defined as the level of unemployment compatible with stable inflation)
and the observed level of unemployment in the estimation sample.
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shocks.
 The exclusion of the country fixed effects. Country fixed effects are aimed at
controlling for country-specific trends in the employment rate, since the latter
enters the equation in difference. Yet this empirical model might be incorrectly
specified if unobserved heterogeneity between countries applies to the level rather
than the growth rate of the employment rate, in which case a model without fixed
effects would better capture the underlying dynamics. This is unlikely to be the
case here since the country fixed effects are statistically significant in the baseline
regressions. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, regressions are run without country
fixed effects.
The baseline results appear to be robust to these robustness checks (Table 5).
Estimates obtained by reducing or alternatively, by increasing the number of re-
form shocks (shocks identified respectively with a threshold of 2.5 standard devia-
tions and with a threshold of 1.5 standard deviations) are qualitatively similar to
those obtained in the baseline (Panels A and B), although coefficients get more sig-
nificant when the number of shocks considered is larger. Introducing “reverse”
reforms in the regression (Panel C) barely modifies the estimates, suggesting that the
effects of the unemployment benefit reform identified in the baseline approach are
not overestimated due to the omission of increases in benefit replacement rates that
may dampen labor market performance. Results from an alternative approach based
on a single reform shock variable including positive and negative shocks are gener-
ally less robust than those obtained when allowing the coefficient to differ between
opposite-signed reforms (Table 5 Panel D). This suggests that the effects of policy
changes are not symmetrical. Finally, results reported in Table 5, Panel E excluding
country fixed effects are more significant than those obtained with country fixed
effects, with positive effects of a decrease in the benefit replacement rates that may
materialize from the first year.5. Conclusion
Based on some identification of reform “shocks” and the estimation of associated
impulse response functions, this paper has found robust evidence that unemployment
benefit reforms deliver employment gains only gradually, typically over a period of
several years. This finding is consistent with the presence of frictions in labor markets
and should therefore not come as a surprise. While benefit reforms are not found to
entail any transitional losses in general, one exception seems to be when they are
implemented in severely depressed labor markets. This tentative finding is of some
relevance for the ongoing experience of euro area countries that are seeking to revise
job and output growth by means of structural reform, including of their labor market
institutions. It also points to some trade-off between short-term economic and political
economy considerations: taken at face value the results might suggest postponing
benefit reforms until economic slack is removed, but at the same time past experiences
and political economy studies indicate that hard-to-implement reforms are easier to
push through in crisis times.
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis
Panel A - Use of a more stringent criterion for the identification of shocks (2,5 standard deviation)
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2.5 standard deviation threshold
0.026 0.036 0.054* 0.074* 0.106**
(0.019) (0.035) (0.031) (0.041) (0.043)







Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2.5 standard deviation threshold
11 9.84 2.65 −7 −14,75
Panel B - Use of a less stringent criterion for the identification of shocks (1.5 standard deviation)
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 1.5 standard deviation threshold
0.038 0.063 0.093** 0.138** 0.171***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.043) (0.051) (0.051)







Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 1.5 standard deviation threshold
23 7.34 3.068 −4 −14.75
Panel C - Controlling for “reverse” reform shocks
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
0.026 0.045 0.066* 0.094** 0.124**
(0.018) (0.036) (0.032) (0.043) (0.047)
Increase of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
−0.008 −0.013 −0.016 −0.008 0.004
(0.019) (0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.040)







Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
16 8.55 2.93 −5.50 −14.75
Increase of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
10 18.84 8.61 11.54 38.46
Panel D –Controlling for “reverse” reform shocks (single variable including two types of shocks)
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Change of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
−0.013 −0.022 −0.028 −0.029 −0.027
(−1.06) (−0.76) (−0.84) (−0.91) (−0.77)







Change of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
26 1.99 14.71 −14.75 38.46
Panel E - Excluding country fixed effects
Year after the shock Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
0.044** 0.090*** 0.155*** 0.220** 0.283***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.046) (0.081) (0.094)
R2 0.460 0.448 0.408 0.380 0.358
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Decline of initial UB replacement
rate 2 standard deviation threshold
16 8.55 2.93 −5.50 −14.75
For all panels
No. observations 503 474 446 418 390
No. of countries 29 28 28 28 28
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All regressions include country fixed effects except in Panel D. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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1 The existence of interactions between labor market institutions implies in particular that
the adverse employment effects of high and long-lasting benefits can be mitigated and even
possibly be fully offset by well-designed active labor market policies, along the lines of the
Danish “flexicurity” model. For empirical evidence on such effect and on interactions be-
tween labor and product market regulations more broadly, see Bassanini and Duval (2009).
2 A priori, one potential concern could be that some large unemployment benefit
reforms may have been incremental in nature, and would therefore be missed by the
criterion applied here. This is a feature which the empirical approach, which focuses on
reform “shocks”, cannot fully capture. However, because any large but incremental
reforms will be coded as non-reforms, the empirical results can only be “biased” against
finding significant effects.
3 While our construction of the reform shock variables is inspired by Romer and
Romer’s, it is worth underlying the differences between the two approaches. Romer and
Romer (2010) use a vast narrative record describing the motivation of tax changes from
which the authors identify reforms that are not directly related with other develop-
ments affecting output. In contrast to the narrative approach used by Romer and
Romer, our identification strategy relies on the use of a threshold approach to identify
major changes in the institutional variable. The impacts of these major shocks are then
estimated against the scenario of either no reform or gradual reform.
4 An alternative to this econometric approach would have been to estimate one single
auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification and to derive IRFs from the estimated
coefficients. This approach was initially proposed by Romer and Romer (1989, 2010), and
it has been recently applied by Cerra and Saxena (2008) to assess the impact of financial
crises on GDP growth. However, because IRFs are calculated recursively in this approach,
they have been criticized for being sensitive to small specification errors that always
exist in practice (Teulings and Zubanov 2010). Specifically, IRFs derived using an
ARDL specification tend to be sensitive to the choice of the number of lags, and as a
result can be unstable.
5 More precisely, this measure captures the extent to which unemployment benefits
decline throughout the unemployment spell. In practice, it appears to vary between 0.2
and 1, where 1 indicates a situation where unemployment benefits do not decline
during the period spent in unemployment.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/126 The impact of the reform is found to be statistically insignificant for values of the unemploy-
ment gap lower than −1.4 and significantly negative for values of the unemployment gap lower
than −5.2 (the minimum level of the unemployment gap is equal to −6.8 in the sample).
7 Following the Romer and Romer (2010) approach used above, the associated variable
is equal to this large change when it is observed and zero otherwise.
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